This paper proposes a practical method for estimating consumer lock-in effects from firm-level data. The method compares the behavior of already contracted consumers to the behavior of new consumers, the latter serving as a counterfactual to the former. In panel regressions on firms' incoming and quitting consumers, we look at the differential response to price changes and identify the lock-in effect from the difference between the two. We discuss the potential econometric issues and measurement problems and offer solutions to them. We illustrate our method by analyzing the market for personal loans in Hungary and find strong lock-in effects.
Introduction
Consumer lock-in is a critical factor in evaluating …rms'market power in a dynamic framework. If consumers'ability to change their service provider is limited, due to the presence of switching costs for instance, then it decreases the elasticity of demand, which can lead to price increases in later periods. Consumer lock-in may also contribute to raising barriers to expansion for competitors, enabling incumbent …rms to conserve their strong market position. These theories of harm imply that lock-in is an important concern for competition authorities and sectoral regulators alike, 1 and regulatory policies were speci…cally designed to increase consumer mobility in most network industries. 2 This paper proposes a practical and intuitive approach for estimating lock-in e¤ects in a direct way, which has two practical advantages. First, it stays within a demand analysis framework and thus there is no need to make strong assumptions on market structure. Second, it requires only …rm-level data, which are less expensive and easier to collect than consumer-level data, and most regulatory bodies have the legislative power to acquire them.
We develop an empirical method that compares the reactions of new consumers to the reactions of old consumers with respect to price changes. 3 The di¤erence between these two reactions will give an indication on …rms'market power over old consumers. The basis of our identi…cation is the idea that the behavior of new consumers can describe the behavior of old consumers in the absence of lock-in. In other words, the group of new consumers can provide the counterfactual outcomes to the group of old consumers, in the spirit of the program evaluation literature (see, for example, Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009 ). 4 1 The theoretical literature is thoroughly reviewed by Farrell and Klemperer (2007) . 2 An important example is mobile telephone number portability. See Maicas et al. (2009) , and the references therein, on estimating the e¤ect of number portability on switching costs and consumer mobility. 3 A new consumer is de…ned as someone making her …rst purchase decision on the market, while an old consumer is already a customer of a …rm. 4 A simple thought experiment can be given with two identical consumers N ew and Old who di¤er only in that
Old has been the customer of …rm j for some time. Suppose that at current prices N ew would also buy from …rm j, but there is a change in the relative price of …rm j that is large enough to make N ew choose another …rm. If there were no lock-in e¤ects, Old would react in the exact same way to this price change and would switch. However, if
When we have ideal data at hand, our empirical model consists of a system of two panel regressions estimated in …rst di¤erences, which measures the e¤ect of a change in the relative price of a given …rm on the respective …rm's "market share" between two groups of consumers.
The dependent variable in the …rst equation is the market share of the respective …rm in terms of consumers who are new to the market. The dependent variable in the second equation is the retention rate, i.e. the "market share" of the …rm among its own customers from the previous time period. The lock-in e¤ects are measured by comparing the e¤ects of the same price change on these two market shares. The di¤erence of the two responses is the fraction of old consumers who would have switched if they had been new consumers but were prevented from doing so because of lock-in.
This identi…cation strategy is very similar to a "di¤erence-in-di¤erences" approach, in which one compares the behavioral response of a group that may be locked-in to the behavioral response of another group that is not.
For the counterfactual approach to successfully identify the lock-in e¤ects, the two groups of old and new consumers have to be similar in terms of their price elasticity and switching behavior.
This assumption does allow for di¤erences among consumers entering the market in di¤erent time periods, as long as such di¤erences are controlled for or are unrelated to the behavior we examine. 5 We believe that this condition is more likely to be satis…ed in developed markets and/or markets with relatively homogenous goods, in which market entry may be due to exogenous shocks. Examples for such markets include loan contracts -which we analyze in our application -, consumer utilities and standard telecommunication services. Incidentally, these are also the typical industries where competition policy and regulation are more concerned with problems of market power.
With appropriate data, this counterfactual approach can be implemented in a relatively straightforward fashion by panel data methods with …rm-speci…c and time …xed e¤ects. Unfortunately, however, information on consumers who are new to the market and old consumers who switch to other …rms is typically not present in …rm-level data. 6 We therefore implement the proposed switching costs are su¢ ciently large, Old might stay locked-in with …rm j. 5 For exampe, more informed or more patient consumers might enter the market in di¤erent time periods, but this heterogeneity does not necessarily mean that their switching reactions will be di¤erent depending on whether they are locked-in or not. 6 While the development of information technologies now allows most …rms to collect rich data on their customers, 3 method by using the number of consumers joining …rms and the number of consumers leaving …rms and construct proxy variables for changes in the fraction of new and old consumers. We address the potential biases due to the use of such proxy variables, and develop an easy-to-implement formula that corrects for the biases under reasonable assumptions. Data on prices and the number of consumers joining and leaving …rms are usually available in markets with long-term contracts.
As an illustration, we apply the estimation method to the market of personal loans in Hungary. According to our estimates, a one percentage point increase in interest rates leads to a 0.61 percentage points decrease in demand among new consumers, compared to a 0.13 percentage points decrease among the banks'old consumers. This means that old consumers'responsiveness is four …fths lower than the responsiveness of new consumers. Our bias-corrected estimates indicate substantial lock-in as well. We can reject the hypothesis of perfect consumer mobility, while the hypothesis of complete consumer lock-in (as assumed in many theoretical models) cannot be rejected. Our method was applied in the banking sector inquiry of the Hungarian Competition Authority, and as a result, several regulatory recommendations were made to facilitate consumers' switching between …rms.
Economic framework and parameters of interest
We do not explicitly model …rms'behavior because our empirical model does not require an explicit structure, but we nevertheless outline the economic setup in the background of our measurement strategy. There are J …rms o¤ering a contract for a good (or service) lasting for T periods with required payments p jt in each period. Each consumer demands at most one good, which might be homogenous or di¤erentiated. In each period t, some new consumers, who are drawn from the same population as previous consumers, enter the market; and some old consumers leave the market because of expiring contracts. Consumers can be heterogenous in their reservation prices and in other taste parameters. We assume that both new and old customers of a given …rm face the same these databases are rarely merged at the industry level for a general analysis.
4 price p jt . 7 If in any period t a consumer buying from …rm j in period t 1 (an "old" consumer of …rm j)
wants to leave …rm j for …rm k because of a better price o¤er, she faces some switching costs. 8 We allow switching costs to vary across individuals, so there is no loss of generality in assuming that switching costs are …xed (i.e. they do not depend on the value of the transaction).
If a consumer i is new to the market in period t; let n ijt denote the probability that she buys the product from …rm j under existing prices. Similarly, if consumer i is an old customer of …rm j (that is she bought from …rm j in period t 1), let r ijt denote the probability that …rm j retains this consumer (so she continues to buy from …rm j). The realized choice probabilities will be the share of …rm j from the total set of new consumers and from …rm j's old consumers, respectively.
We are interested in how an increase in the price of …rm j a¤ects these choice probabilities.
The responses to price changes are likely non-positive, so n jt = p jt 0 and r jt = p jt 0. Our most important assumption is that the e¤ect of a price increase on the behavior of new and old customers would be the same in the absence of lock-in. If switching costs are high enough, they will increase the threshold value of a price increase that induces a reaction for some consumers. Such consumers would not switch if the actual price increase is lower than this threshold even though they would have chosen another …rm in the absence of switching costs. These consumers are locked in because of switching costs. As a result, the average e¤ect of the same price increase is likely to be smaller for old consumers than for new consumers, i.e. j n jt = p jt j j r jt = p jt j. Ideally, these properties on the changes to be measured could be derived from a more structural framework of discrete choice with switching costs. 9 Guided by the above properties, we aim to identify the lock-in e¤ects from the di¤erence of the e¤ects of the same price increase on the choice probability of new consumers and the retention 7 While this assumption is correct in the context of our empirical application, it is common industry practice to charge di¤erent prices to old and new consumers in some other markets. In such cases one should measure two prices or address the potential bias resulting from price di¤erences if only one data point on price is available. 8 See the next section for a more detailed discussion on what factors can be taken as switching costs. 9 Our Online Appendix C speci…es a simple theoretical choice model that delivers the intuitive results of our counterfactual approach. 5 probability:
Indicator jt shows how much more likely it is that a consumer switches away from …rm j in response to a small increase in p jt if she is new to the market than if she is already a customer of …rm j. In a frequentist interpretation, this di¤erence shows the fraction of old consumers who are prevented from leaving …rm j in period t but would have switched in the absence of lock-in. If no old consumer is constrained by lock-in then jt = 0; while if lock-in is complete for all customers of …rm j in period t, then jt = j n jt = p jt j. Naturally, the value of jt depends on the distribution of demand parameters and switching costs, as well as on the period-speci…c market position of …rm j. In empirical applications, an average value of is likely to be the best absolute indicator of industry lock-in e¤ect.
Since di¤erent markets can be characterized by di¤erent demand elasticities and market structures, is not necessarily comparable across markets. For comparisons, it is more convenient to use a normalized version of jt :
This relative indicator of the lock-in e¤ect shows the fraction of consumers prevented from switching from among the consumers who would have switched in the absence of any lock-in. By this de…nition, jt might takes on values between 0 (nobody is constrained by lock-in) and 1 (all of those who would have switched without switching costs are constrained by lock-in).
Using the estimated and its sampling distribution, it is possible to test the hypothesis of two polar cases. The hypothesis of = 0 corresponds to perfect consumer mobility (no lock-in of any degree), while the hypothesis of = 1 corresponds to complete lock-in.
3 Links between lock-in e¤ects and switching costs
Lock-in and switching costs are very much interrelated, as discussed in length by Farrell and Klemperer (2007) . The presence of signi…cant switching costs will necessarily lead to some lockedin consumers, but lock-in might actually result from factors other than switching costs in the strict 6 sense. It is therefore useful to clarify what we mean by switching costs and how this connects to our central de…nition of lock-in.
As Farrell and Klemperer (2007, p. 1972 ) de…ne, "a product has classic switching costs if a buyer will purchase it repeatedly and will …nd it costly to switch from one seller to another".
Switching costs can include all transaction costs related to the process of switching: exit costs from the previous seller, the costs of searching for new sellers and the costs of entry related to the new seller. Switching costs should not be restricted only to monetary costs: search costs are usually opportunity costs of time, while exit costs could entail psychological transaction costs or loss of utility when the consumer purchased complementary products from the speci…c …rm or has a speci…c preference for variety.
The approach taken by our paper de…nes consumer lock-in as customer inertia, a tendency to remain in an ongoing relationship with a speci…c seller. This outcome can especially manifest as a reduced responsiveness to the given seller's (relative) price increases, but also as an increased likelihood to repurchase the original or complementary goods from the supplier. The state dependency of consumer choice is a crucial factor to consider, and we should be careful not to interpret all situations with small price responsiveness as lock-in. 10 For example, strong consumer preference for a given …rm might also lead to lower own-price elasticities, but this kind of loyalty does not result from the previous relationship with the seller itself. 11 It is therefore crucial in our empirical applications that we can identify the old consumers (installed base) of each …rm.
By using the broad de…nition of switching costs presented above, there are many cases where we can attribute lock-in to switching costs. For example, if a consumer settles for a speci…c service provider after some searching and then does not reevaluate the available options until she has bad experiences with that …rm, then this mental lock-in can be seen as a result of psychological switching 1 0 See Dubé et al (2010) for a detailed discussion of state dependence in consumer choices and the various factors that could explain it. 1 1 It should be noted though that the preference towards a given …rm might evolve because of the experience of using that speci…c …rm's product, especially if the consumer was not fully informed before the transaction. This process, however, changes the reservation price (demand) of the given consumer for the product, not the costs of switching.
costs. However, if a …rm targets its old customers with personalized marketing o¤ers (information lea ‡ets, promotions), these specialized actions of the …rm (and not only the relationship itself) are the ones a¤ecting the price responsiveness of consumers, so switching costs have a much smaller (maybe negligible) role to play.
In conclusion, the existence of switching costs is maybe the most signi…cant, but not the only contributing factor to lock-in. It is hard to empirically assess the magnitude of switching costs'
contribution, but this is not strictly necessary either as we focus on estimating the lock-in e¤ects.
Still, our empirical approach can bene…t from the insights of the switching costs literature.
Connections to the existing literature
The Industrial Organization model closest to our setup is the theoretical framework of Beggs and Klemperer (1992) . This classic paper analyzes dynamic competition in the presence of switching costs, and studies the main trade-o¤ between charging high prices to rip o¤ locked-in consumers versus low prices to attract new ones. A substantive di¤erence to our setting is, however, that
Beggs and Klemperer assume that switching costs are so large that they prohibit consumers from switching in equilibrium (so there is complete lock-in), while we allow switching costs to take on any value, so some fraction of old consumers may switch. 12 When solving for equilibrium, Beggs and Klemperer analyze a¢ ne strategies in which each …rm's price is a linear function of its market share plus some …rm-speci…c constants. Our basic equations are of a similar form, but we estimate the e¤ects of price changes on changes in choice probabilities and corresponding market shares.
There are also several theoretical predictions of the Beggs-Klemperer model that can be checked in empirical applications: entry should be attractive despite the presence of switching costs; growth in demand should cause prices to fall; and larger …rms should initially set higher prices and therefore lose market shares.
From a practical point of view, three issues are of principal empirical importance considering lock-in: 1) the presence and magnitude of switching costs or other factors causing lock-in, 2) the magnitude of consumer lock-in and 3) the resulting e¤ects on prices. Most empirical papers have focused exclusively on switching costs as the underlying factor behind lock-in and analyzed the third question without the intermediate step, 13 and some reviewed in this section look at the …rst. However, empirical evidence on lock-in e¤ects as such is scarce in Industrial Organization applications, because its identi…cation and quanti…cation present multiple methodological challenges. 14 There are a few examples where switching costs were estimated from individual-level data: for example, in the online brokerage industry by Chen and Hitt (2002) , for breakfast cereals by Shum We can also …nd examples where the state dependency of consumer choices was empirically examined, typically by studying individual-level data. 15 .These papers, however, focus on separating the key factors behind state dependency (which is possible by observing a large sample of subsequent purchases), while our paper focuses on the simple testing of state-dependency based on aggregated data. Some papers use …rm-level data to estimate switching costs. These papers focus on the magnitude of switching costs compared to prices as opposed to the lock-in e¤ects. We know of two structural studies, which derive a speci…c model of competition in the presence of switching costs and then estimate equilibrium conditions for prices or market shares. Shy (2002) market, and vary between 0 and 11% of the average balance on the Finnish bank deposit market.
Kim et al. (2003) model consumers' transitions and banks' intertemporal decision-making in a
dynamic framework and apply it to the Norwegian loan market: their estimated switching costs are 4% of the average loan's value. Both papers measure switching costs in terms of prices, but they do not provide direct estimates for the lock-in e¤ect of switching costs. Because of the structural approach, they also need correctly speci…ed models of competition, in contrast to our counterfactual approach.
The idea that a reduced-form model can capture how the presence of switching costs alters consumers'price responsiveness is of course not completely new. In a homogenous good industry, small cross-price elasticity estimates across …rms may indicate large switching costs because price increases do not result in signi…cant losses to competitors. 16 Our method requires more data (two measures of quantity as opposed to one), but it has the additional advantage of identifying the magnitude of the lock-in e¤ects of switching costs, and is also applicable to di¤erentiated goods industries. There are also a few empirical papers on switching costs that use proxies in their empirical implementations, but they use proxies directly for the unobservable switching costs, 17 while our paper uses variables to approximate the magnitude of terminating and switching consumers.
Schiraldi (2011) uses a counterfactual approach in order to estimate transaction costs (relative to prices) in the Italian car market and …nds large variation in transaction costs. This paper is similar to our approach in that he compares the share of consumers holding a car to the share of consumers buying the same car in the same period, but it uses individual data to estimate a structural dynamic model of consumer demand.
4 Empirical strategy
Ideal estimation
We are interested in the e¤ect of a change in the price of the product on two probabilities. The …rst is the probability of a new consumer choosing …rm j, which we denote by n jt . The second is the probability of an old consumer of …rm j to remaining with …rm j, and we denote this by r jt .
The empirical counterparts of these probabilities are …rm j's market shares among new consumers and its own old consumers, respectively. We estimate the e¤ects of price changes on these two probabilities from the following two equations:
where star superscripts denote estimations in the ideal situation where the n and r variables are observed. Recall that we measure prices p relative to the market average. The regressions are easily generalizable to alternative measures of relative prices.
In most applications, it makes sense to relate changes in consumer decisions to lagged price The similarity of new and old consumers is required in terms of the price changes they face as well. This is obviously satis…ed if …rms cannot charge di¤erent prices to new and old consumers.
It may also be satis…ed, however, if such price discrimination is feasible as long p is the same for new and old consumers. Examples for the latter include …xed discounts or free complementary items for new consumers if prices are entered in levels in the regressions, or proportional discounts if prices are entered in logarithmic form.
Condition 2 Price changes are exogenous to changes in demand.
The second condition is needed to identify changes in demand.
Under these two conditions, OLS regressions of (3) and (4) consistently estimate the theoretical and coe¢ cients. 18 As a result,^ =^ ^ , and (5)
are consistent estimators of and as de…ned in (1) and (2) because they are continuous in the consistent^ and^ estimators. Their sampling distribution involves the joint sampling distribution of^ and^ .^ is also nonlinear in the regression estimators. Therefore, estimating con…dence intervals is probably best done by bootstrapping or other simulation-based methods.
The regression coe¢ cients and do not vary across …rms. As a result, the lock-in measures and do not vary across …rms, either. This restriction is consistent with the assumption of homogenous lock-in e¤ects, but that assumption is unlikely to be true. Firms may be very di¤erent in their costumer base, loyalty programs etc. In principle, our framework can be generalized to allow for …rm-speci…c coe¢ cients on consumer response j and j and …rm-speci…c measures of lock-in ( j and j ). However, because of sample size issues, applications using …rm-level data are likely to produce very imprecise estimates of such …rm-speci…c parameters. The restricted parameters are meaningful without making the homogeneity assumption, too: and measure average responses across all …rms, and thus and measure the average degree of lock-in.
Firm-speci…c time-invariant heterogeneity in market share in new contracts (n jt ) and the fraction of remaining consumers (r jt ) are …ltered out in the regressions because they are speci…ed in …rst di¤erences. Similarly, as we estimate the evolutions of shares, the speci…cations take care of the shocks a¤ecting all …rms in the same way (although this is strictly true only for n jt ).
It is advisable to include time …xed e¤ects and additional cross-section …xed e¤ects in order to control for aggregate changes and …rm-speci…c trends. Note that time …xed e¤ects control for everything that is common to all …rms in a given time period, including the potential benchmark price, whether it is the average or the minimum. As a result, the theoretically important distinction between using absolute versus relative prices becomes less relevant empirically if time …xed e¤ects are included. 19 Time …xed e¤ects can also control, to some degree, for changes in market structure or the outside option.
Addressing potential econometric problems
In order to meet Conditions 1 and 2, regression models (3) and (4) may in general include other variables. As we noted previously, it may be a good idea to include …rm and time …xed e¤ects.
Note that the model is de…ned in …rst di¤erences so …rm-speci…c time-invariant factors are controlled for automatically. Additional …rm …xed e¤ects in the …rst-di¤erence speci…cation control for …rm-speci…c (possibly stochastic) trends. Additional year …xed e¤ects control for nonlinearities in aggregate trends.
Condition 2 requires exogenous variation in prices. Such exogeneity is best ensured by natural experiments or the use of valid instrumental variables. Note, however, that …nding valid instruments is di¢ cult in these applications, even more so than in demand analysis in general. It is standard in the Empirical Industrial Organization literature to use the competitors' characteristics as instruments. That is obviously ruled out here as the competitors'behavior is likely to a¤ect switching (and thus r) directly. Another set of usual variables are "cost shifters." Since our application looks for variation in prices within the same market, cost shifters are likely to be extremely weak instruments because they are likely to a¤ect competitors in similar ways. In fact, any instrument that is likely to a¤ect all …rms within the market in a similar way would be a bad candidate.
An alternative to instrumental variables (although typically imperfect) is the use of proxy variables for endogenous price changes. Note that in our model the behavioral e¤ects are captured by lagged price changes on the right-hand side ( p jt 1 ) in order to allow for delays in the responses.
An important potential source of endogeneity is the reaction of …rms to changes in new demand or the stock of their consumers. Lagged prices are free of this endogeneity since …rms cannot change their prices retroactively. As a result, p jt 1 the u jt variables are uncorrelated in the absence of serial correlation. On the other hand, serial correlation may lead to endogeneity if it a¤ects both unobservables (u) and price changes ( p). Including contemporaneous price changes p jt can capture serial correlation in the right-hand side variables and therefore control for endogenous price changes. 20 Comparing lock-in in di¤erent regimes is straightforward by comparing^ and^ estimated from separate samples. Such estimation can be more e¢ cient if carried out in a pooled sample with appropriate interactions with p t 1 . Interactions may be helpful in assessing the role of observable …rm-speci…c switching cost components, too. By interacting their level with price changes in regressions (3) and (4), one can estimate switching costs^ and^ at di¤erent levels of observed cost components. In our example of banking loans, loan termination fees are potentially observed …rm-speci…c switching cost components. Note however, that interactions with …rms-speci…c switching cost components can be problematic as they are choice variables to …rms. Termination fees may respond to switching itself, leading to additional simultaneity bias. As a result, observed variation in termination fees is far from ideal to address the role of monetary switching costs in consumer lock-in.
The problems listed above may or may not occur in speci…c applications, and they need to be 14 assessed on a case by case basis.
Measurement of the main variables
It is feasible to estimate the lock-in e¤ects by using panel data on all …rms and with information on prices and two quantities: the number of consumers joining and leaving each …rm. In order to see the relationship of these quantities to probabilities n jt and r jt , we need to understand in detail how they are measured.
Let S jt denote the stock of all consumers who buy from …rm j in period t. We denote the number of incoming consumers to …rm j by IN jt and the number of outgoing consumers from …rm j by OU T jt . If we can separate the number of consumers whose contract is expiring with …rm j (that is they do not face explicit exit costs) from the outgoing consumers, we denote this number by X jt -in this case, OU T jt measures consumers who deliberately terminated their ongoing purchasing relationship with …rm j. Firm j's stock can be therefore decomposed as:
Incoming consumers can be further separated in two categories: completely new consumers N jt and switchers from other …rms to …rm j denoted by T jt . Outgoing consumers also belong in one of two groups: Q jt quit the market for good (because of a change in an individual factor, such as income) and F jt switch to other …rms from …rm j (because of a price change). Therefore, we have
To illustrate these decompositions, let us take an example from the market of banking loans, to which we shall return in our application. The stock S jt 1 is the number of consumers who have a loan contract with bank j at the beginning of period t. The stock may change in three ways:
by IN jt new loans are signed, OU T jt loans are repaid before their expiration date, and X jt loans expire in the respective period. Q jt consumers repay their loans before their expiration and quit the market, while F jt consumers re…nance their loans and leave bank j for another bank. Finally, the bank's incoming consumers consist of consumers who are new to the market (N jt ) and consumers who re…nance (T jt ), arriving to bank j from other banks.
A new consumer's realized probability of joining …rm j is
which is simply …rm j's market share from among new consumers in period t. At the beginning of period t, …rm j has S jt 1 old consumers. From among them, X jt + Q jt leave the …rm without switching, and an additional F jt leave due to switching. The pool of potential switchers is therefore S jt 1 X jt Q jt , and F jt of them choose to switch. The realized retention rate of …rm j is therefore
This probability equals the fraction of consumers staying with …rm j from among all consumers who could have been with that …rm.
In order to implement the estimation model speci…ed in (3) and (4) all variables in decomposition (8) should be measured. However, …rm-level aggregates usually allow us to measure the variables in decomposition (7) only. We address this problem in the next section.
In certain market contexts, all stock and ‡ow variables can be measured in the value of contracts or revenues instead of the number of consumers. If one can measure both variables, like in our banking example, one might want to work with both in order to check the robustness of the results.
The measurement of prices is more straightforward but it is not without problems. In principle,
we should keep the prices of all other …rms constant . In our application, we shall make the simpli…cation of including the price of …rm j relative to other prices in a single variable, instead of entering all other prices. Depending on the speci…c market context, relative prices may be de…ned as di¤erences, ratios or log di¤erences, with at least two possible benchmark prices: the best possible o¤er (smallest price) or the market average. Comparing to the smallest price is consistent with perfectly informed and rational consumers. This may be better for markets where prices are relatively easy to acquire and compare, like internet subscriptions. Comparing to the average price is consistent with consumers not being able to collect and process all available price information, and thus comparing the price of …rm j to that of only a few competitors. 21 This latter approach may serve better for markets where search costs are likely to be signi…cant, like banking or telecommunications services.
Addressing data problems in …rm-level analysis
In a typical application on …rm-level data, the ideal left-hand side variables in (3) and (4) are unobserved: aggregate data on the status of the consumer in previous time periods are seldom available. However, the number of incoming and outgoing consumers from decomposition (7) is often available, and we argue that these can be used as proxies in our estimations.
We denote the proxy of n by m and the proxy of r by q, and de…ne them as follows:
By using these proxies, our regressions to estimate become:
The principal question is how estimators^ and^ are related to the ideal estimators^ and , respectively. This depends on whether the discrepancies between proxy and ideal variables are correlated with (lagged) price changes, the right-hand side variable of each regression. Formally, we would need Cov ( d mjt ; p jt 1 ) = 0 and Cov ( d qjt ; p jt 1 ) = 0 to hold, where d mjt = m jt n jt and d qjt = q jt r jt . We argue that the second covariance condition is likely to be satis…ed, but the …rst is not.
In the applied estimation model outlined in this section, the proxy of n jt is m jt , the market share in all new loans issued in period t as de…ned in (11) . This proxy variable errs by potentially including switching consumers T jt to …rm j: IN jt = N jt + T jt . Therefore the discrepancy between the ideal variable and the measured one, d mjt = m jt n jt , includes switching consumers. If price changes induce any switching, an increase in …rm j's price may discourage switching consumers as well as new consumers. As a result, the estimated reaction of new consumers is biased downwards (looks stronger than it is). Formally, we have that
The bias is due to the fact that a price increase decreases switching to the …rm from other …rms as well as the market share in terms of new consumers. The magnitude of the bias is related to the decrease in the probability of switching to the …rm in response to the price increase. It is therefore related to the e¤ect of the price increase on the retention probability of the other …rms.
The stronger the e¤ect of a relative price change on switching to a …rm from other …rms is, the larger the bias in measuring the e¤ect on new consumers.
In case of perfect lock-in, there are no consumers switching from other …rms and thus there is no bias in^ . An immediate consequence is that the bias has no e¤ect on the consistency of a test for complete lock-in because there is no bias under its null hypothesis (H 0 : = 1). This is an important result as, in many cases, testing for perfect lock-in is one of the most important questions of the analysis.
In the absence of perfect lock-in, the bias is related to the e¤ect of price changes on the retention probability in the market. In Appendix A, we show that under reasonable assumptions, one can approximate the upper bound to the bias by the product of the average e¤ect of relative price changes on the retention probability in the market ( ) and the average relative size of the two "markets" of a …rm, its old consumers and the pool of new consumers:
The measurement problem in the retention probability is likely to cause less problems. The proxy of r jt is q jt as de…ned in (12), based on contract terminations (loan repayments in our example) before expiration date. Recall that this variable is meant to proxy the fraction of consumers who did not switch after the price change. It errs on two counts. First, the numerator is OU T jt = F jt + Q jt instead of F jt : It therefore includes consumers Q jt who repay their loans before expiration date but do not re…nance at other banks. Second, the denominator is S jt 1 X jt instead of S jt 1 X jt Q jt ; which again includes Q jt . The discrepancy d qjt = q jt r jt is due to these two facts: the numerator and the denominator of r jt are both increased by the same Q jt .
The discrepancy is positive, since the numerator of r jt is smaller than the denominator. But this discrepancy is unlikely to lead to biased estimates in the regression. The question is whether nonre…nancing terminations Q jt are correlated with price changes in the previous period. Most likely they are not, because these terminations are typically due to positive income shocks, which are typically unrelated to price movements. Therefore, we can assume that Cov ( d qjt ; p jt 1 ) = 0. 
In absolute value, the corrected estimators are the lower bounds of the true parameters and , respectively. The stronger the estimated switching response (the larger^ ) is, the larger the e¤ect of the bias correction will be. But the e¤ect is di¤erent for and , and a smaller e¤ect is expected in terms of the latter.
Illustrative application
In this section we present an application in order to show how our measurement model can be put to Old consumers are clients who already have a loan contract at one of the banks. In any period (quarter) they can stay at their original bank or terminate the loan contract and re…nance it with a loan from another bank at a more favorable rate. The latter behavior is the switching we are interested in. There is no price discrimination between the old and the new consumers of a certain bank concerning personal loans.
The overall dataset covers the nine largest banks in Hungary that hold at least a one per cent market share on the personal loan market. Together, they cover over 90 per cent of the market for all personal loans. We use quarterly data on prices and the number and contract value of new contracts and terminated contracts. Of the nine banks, seven provided adequate data on the number of consumers and six on the value of terminated contracts. The unbalanced panel used in our analysis covers all or almost all observations for at least half of the banks, and at least half of the quarters for the remaining ones, leading to a total number of observations of 117 for consumer numbers and 97 for contract values. Nonrespondents were among the smaller banks. Prices p jt are measured by the annual percentage rate (APR) of the banks' most popular (modal) product in terms of loan value and duration, quoted by the bank in that speci…c quarter. Most banks had a single product in the personal loan market during the period. Hungarian …nancial regulations require banks to calculate and publish APR for all products. By regulation, the APR includes all entry costs but not the termination costs. Table 1 shows the most important data for the market using our sample. The market grew dynamically during the observed time period, its growth rate slowing down somewhat after 2005. We also observe decreasing average prices, 23 some entry in the middle of the period, and larger …rms with higher prices and declining market shares, facts that may be consistent with the previously discussed Beggs-Klemperer (1992) framework of dynamic competition with switching costs. Of course, observed changes in APR may be due to various reasons. In order to …lter out the aggregate component of such changes, year …xed e¤ects are included in the regressions.
The main explanatory variable is the APR relative to the market average, lagged by one period.
Lagging makes sense because changes are advertised only after they are made and thus consumers are likely to react with some time lag. We estimate regressions (13) and (14) and include bank and time period …xed e¤ects. Including bank …xed e¤ects ensures that potential bank-speci…c trends do not interfere with the identi…cation. Including time period (quarterly) …xed e¤ects ensures that common e¤ects on all banks do not interfere with the identi…cation. In particular, the e¤ects of potential changes in the outside option, business cycle or seasonality are …ltered out (to the extent of a linear approximation). We do not have credible instruments for price changes nor clean natural experiments that would ensure that variation in prices is exogenous to consumer demand. Instead, in the spirit of our discussion of the econometric problems in section 4.2, we include contemporaneous price changes p jt next to the main variable p jt 1 as a proxy variable for potential endogeneity.
In the main text we present the OLS estimates of the coe¢ cients and and the estimates of and based on those OLS coe¢ cients. We return to the bias-corrected estimates later. Summary statistics and the complete set of parameter estimates and regression statistics are in Appendix B (Tables B1 and B2 ). We present bootstrap con…dence intervals on the 5 th and 95 th percentiles.
These are estimated by block-bootstrap (i.e. re-sampling of complete …rm histories as opposed to individual …rm-year observations) in order to account for serial correlation. While the con…dence intervals contain only 90 per cent of the sampling distribution, they are nevertheless rather conservative. This can be seen by comparing the bootstrap standard errors of the^ coe¢ cients to their analytical standard errors shown in Appendix B: the bootstrap standard errors are signi…cantly larger. Table 2 shows the estimates of the regression parameters and the switching cost parameters assuming no bias in^ : Given the sample size, the estimates are reasonably precise. The con…dence interval around the parameter of major interest, , is especially tight. Based on those con…dence intervals, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of complete lock-in. Note that while the estimated consumer response coe¢ cients ^ and^ have con…dence intervals that overlap to some extent, their di¤erence is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero because the error terms in the two market share equations are not independent of each other.
According to the point estimates, one percentage point increase in bank j's APR charges leads to an overall 0:61 percentage point decrease in the probability of new consumers choosing bank j.
In order to have a better feel for the magnitudes, we can transform the estimates into elasticities that measure the e¤ect of a one per cent change in the APR (as opposed to a one percentage point change). The corresponding elasticities are quite strong: one per cent increase in the APR is estimated to lead to a 4:7 per cent decrease in market shares, evaluated at the average market share The same price increase is estimated to induce a mere 0:13 percentage points decrease in the probability of bank j's old consumers staying with the bank. This implies an elasticity of 0:13 (evaluated at the average retention rate of 0:98). The corresponding estimates for the value of contracts are somewhat stronger, in line with the presumption that consumers with larger contracts are more price sensitive.
As we have shown,^ may be a biased estimator of . Since^ is small, the bias is likely to be relatively small. In fact, the bias may be zero because we cannot reject the null hypothesis of complete lock-in. Table 3 shows the estimated lock-in e¤ects corrected for the bias using the formulae in (15) and (16) . The bias-corrected point estimates are somewhat smaller, but close to the non-corrected point estimates. The bias corrections do not change the qualitative conclusions from the previous results. We have carried out robustness checks using various speci…cations and various sub-periods. 25 The results indicate that the inclusion of time …xed e¤ects is important, bank …xed e¤ects are less important (recall that these are bank …xed e¤ects added to panel regressions in …rst di¤erences), and the contemporaneous and leaded proxy variables do not make a di¤erence. We have also estimated regressions with the value of the termination fee included. Termination fees are one-time fees incurred when repaying a loan before expiration date and are therefore potentially important elements of switching costs. The estimated lock-in e¤ects are stronger at higher levels of termination fees, indicating that monetary costs are indeed an important element of switching costs.
Conclusions
Based on a simple thought experiment, we proposed a practical method for estimating the lock-in e¤ects in a direct way by using …rm-level data. The basic idea was to compare demand responses to price changes for consumers who are new to the market and for consumers who are already customers of a given …rm, and the di¤erence should be attributed to lock-in. Implementation of the method required proxies for the following two quantities in each period: new transactions on the market and transactions (contracts) terminated by consumers. Using these proxy variables may lead to biased estimates, but we derived a way to correct for these biases.
We illustrated our method with an application to the Hungarian market of unsecured personal loans and found substantial switching costs. Old consumers' responsiveness to price changes is estimated four …fths lower than new consumers'responsiveness (or somewhat smaller but still more than two thirds lower if allowing for the bias due to measurement problems). The results indicate the existence of strong lock-in e¤ects, to the extent that they might be consistent with complete consumer lock-in.
The Hungarian Competition Authority used this method in a detailed sector inquiry of the banking sector, and the robust conclusion was that switching costs are substantial enough to significantly raise the market power of banks, especially by ex-post fee increases. Therefore, the sector 2 5 The results of the robustness checks and the estimates with termination fees are included in the Online Appendix D.
25
inquiry made several recommendations to the lawmakers and …nancial regulators that were partly aimed at facilitating the switching of consumers (developing a price comparison website in order to increase transparency, foreign currency risks should be also represented in the APR, early repayment charges should be maximized) and at constraining the market power of banks in terms of ex-post price changes by unilateral contract modi…cations.
Appendices
A Deriving an approximation to the bias to^ Our goal is to derive an approximation of the bias to^ , de…ned as bias = Cov ( d mjt ; p jt 1 ) =V ( p jt 1 ).
We want to show that, under reasonable assumptions, the following inequality holds (providing an upper limit to the bias):
bias a E j;t S jt 1 X jt k IN kt We start from the de…nition of the discrepancy d m :
The last result follows from the fact that
Assume that the market is stationary in the sense that the number of new consumers is the same in each time period. Therefore, P j N jt = P j N jt 1 , and so we have that
The switching response to a price increase is captured by . Here we expand the de…nition of in order to connect it to the measure of switching consumers in the discrepancy term.
) and
Note that the magnitude of the change in switching from bank j ( F ) is likely to have the opposite sign to the change in switching to bank j ( T ) : Assume furthermore that the two changes are similar in magnitude: 26
As a result,
This leads to a bound to the bias for each …rm j in each time period t in the following way:
Cov ( r jt ; p jt 1 ) a jt Cov ( r jt ; p jt 1 ) ; where
In the last inequality we replaced
because the latter is estimable, while the former is not.
This completes our derivation. 2 6 The two magnitudes are the same in the aggregate. If lock-in is su¢ ciently strong, the two magnitudes are likely to be small and close to each other, too. If old consumers switch to other …rms primarily because their own …rm changes its price (and not because of other …rms'price changes), a price change by …rm j may lead to F smaller than T in magnitude, leading to smaller bias than derived below. If lock-in is week and old consumers switch to other …rms as a response to price changes at other …rms, too, a price change by …rm j may lead to F larger than T in magnitude, leading to larger bias than derived below. Analytical standard error estimates (clustered at …rm level) in parentheses.
B Summary statistics and complete results
R 2 includes the explanatory power of …xed e¤ects.
signi…cant at 1%, signi…cant at 5%
32

C Details of the discrete choice background
The model describes the decision problem of consumer i who enters into a contractual relationship lasting for S periods with one of the J …rms. 27 The consumer who starts buying the product from …rm j may stay with this …rm till the end or switch to another …rm k at some period s > 1. If she switched her service provider, we continue the decision problem from period s + 1. The problem ends at S (which may be …nite or in…nite). Note that since consumers arrive at di¤erent periods in terms of calendar time, customers of …rm j's product may be at di¤erent contract periods s at a given calendar period t.
Let y ijs = 1 mean that consumer i chooses …rm j in period s and y ijs = 0 otherwise. The cost of being the customer of …rm j in period s will be the observed price p js and an unobserved component u ij that is speci…c to the match of individual i and …rm j. We assume that the unobserved component is time-invariant, which captures the idea that many of those match-speci…c utility components may be persistent (such as taste heterogeneity, regional di¤erences in availability, brand loyalty, etc.). Furthermore, if consumer i switches from …rm _ j to …rm k in period s 2 [2; S](that is if y ij(s 1) = 1 and y ijs = 0) she faces additional switching costs C ij to be paid at the time of switching. Additionally, we assume that consumers cannot predict future price changes so that
If consumer i is a new consumer at s = 1, she will minimize her discounted present value of the expected per-period costs denoted by
. She then chooses …rm j if e ij1 e ik1 for 8k 6 = j, which condition simpli…es to u ij u ik p k1 p j1 for 8k 6 = j, or in vector notation 29
2 7 The outside option may or may not be included among the …rms; as we shall see, our empirical implementation handles outside options with the inclusion of period …xed e¤ects. 2 8 We think this assumption is justi…ed in many applications. Loan contracts provided to individuals or subscription fees usually speci…cy the same per-period …xed fee, while future consumption a¤ecting variable payments (like minutes called) can usually be proxied best by current consumption. 2 9 The dimension of the vectors is (J 1) 1; uij is a vector with all elements uij, pj1 is a vector with all elements pj1, while u ik and p k1 are the (J 1) 1 vectors of the di¤erent u ik and p k1 entries, respectively (k 6 = j).
Intuitively, the individual should choose …rm j if the prices of all other …rms exceed …rm j's price to a degree that the di¤erence is larger than …rm j's subjective costs relative to all other …rms' subjective costs.
If we assume that the vector of unobservables is i.i.d. across individuals, the probability of new consumers choosing …rm j at calendar time t is
where F is the joint c.d.f. of the unobserved cost di¤erentials u ij u ik . Intuitively, an increase in p jt would make some new consumers change their mind and choose another …rm instead: these are those for whom at least one element of the threshold (the left-hand side of (17)) is high enough to exceed the corresponding relative price. n jt , the fraction of consumers buying from …rm j; is decreased by the fraction of such consumers. The magnitude is determined by the fraction of such marginal individuals, which is determined by the shape of F at p kt p jt . Now suppose that consumer i is an old consumer of …rm j in period s 2 [2; S], so y ij(s 1) = 1.
The expected costs of staying with …rm j is e ijs = E s h P S r=s (p jr + u ij )= (1 + ) r i , while choosing another …rm k would mean expected costs e iks = E s h P S r=s (p kr + u ik + c ij )= (1 + )
c ijs is the discounted switching cost distributed equally for all subsequent periods so that C ij = P S r=s c ijs = (1 + ) r (the s subscript in c ijs denotes the time period of switching). Consequently, consumer j would stay with …rm j if and only if u ijt u ikt p ks p js + c ijs for 8k 6 = j, or in vector notation if u ij u ik c ijs p ks p js (19) where c ijs is a vector with all elements c ijs 0:Note that for a given S, c ijs is negatively related to S s (and positively related to s): in a forward-looking decision, the longer the remaining time the smaller the role of one-time switching costs. Or, in other words, switching costs are expected to be more prohibitive the closer the end date S (the larger s). 30
In this way we can write down the retention rate of …rm j in s > 1 by
This choice probability is conditional on the individual's choice in the previous period. That choice itself was a decision to stay with …rm j, too, which was again conditional on the consumer's earlier choice, etc. As a result, the retention probability is a fairly complicated function of all past prices, and solving the retention problem is beyond the scope of our paper. Instead, we focus on some intuitive implications of the retention conditions themselves.
The …rst immediate consequence of condition (19) is that if there are no switching costs, the condition of staying with …rm j is the same as condition (17) for choosing j in the …rst place.
This con…rms the intuition behind our reduced-form approach: the price responsiveness of new consumers can be a valid approximation of the price responsiveness of old consumers in the absence of switching costs.
On the other hand, condition (19) shows that switching costs decrease the threshold that other …rms'relative prices have to exceed in order for consumer i to with …rm j. One consequence is that for given prices, the retention probability is greater than the choice probability of new consumers.
The other consequence is that, starting from above the threshold for new consumers (left-hand side of (17)), own prices have to increase more (other …rms'prices have to decrease more) in order to pass the threshold for old consumers. In particular, for a given increase in own price ( p jt > 0), there are always consumers who would switch in the absence of switching costs but whose c ijs is high enough to prevent switching. As a result, the same price increase leads to a weaker average reaction of old consumers. The fraction of consumers who are prevented from switching depends on the c.d.f. of switching costs c ijs , which in turn depends on the distribution of C ij and heterogeneity in the remaining contract time S s. Since c ijs is increasing in s (decreasing in the remaining contract time S s) we expect more people to switch in growing markets than in stationary markets ceteris paribus.
Estimating consumer lock-in effects from firm-level data Appendix D Additional regression results Table D6 . Regression results with the log of the termination fee included as additional regresor (log(F+!) 
